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ETHICS, ECONOMICS, AND
THE LAW OF PROPERTY*
Frank I. Michelman**
I.  INTRODUCTION
Is it true that in economics lie answers to the ethical  conundrums implicit  in
legal  coercion?'  This chapter  considers  the question  with  respect  to  the  law of
property.  Its thesis is that not even a presumptive preference  for the rudiments of
private  property-much  less  a  conclusive  case  for any detailed  configuration  of
rules  conforming  to  those  rudiments-is  obtainable  by  economic  reason  from
empirically  verified  premises.  Now,  that  is  not  to  say  that  private  property  is
unjustifiable,  but  rather  that  the  justifications  must  finally  appeal  to  kinds  of
premises  and  arguments-call  them  moral  premises  and  arguments-that
economic reason aims at circumventing.
It  is true that the norm for social  ordering invoked  by economic  analysis-
that  is,  the  norm  of efficiency-seems  as  neutral,  as  indisputable,  as  any  such
norm could be.  One has only to start with  a factual judgment that, far from being
controversial,  borders on the pragmatically  irresistible; that is, that our actions  as
human  individuals  are  rationally  motivated,  in  the  minimal  sense  of  aiming  at
general  satisfaction of consistently ordered  sets of privately experienced wants or
preferences.  Efficiency,  then, just  means  arranging matters  so  as to  allow  for as
*  ©  New  York  University  Press.  Reprinted,  with  permission,  from  NOMOS  XXIV:  Ethics,
Economics,  and the  Law  3  (J.  Roland  Pennock  &  John  W.  Chapman  eds.,  N.Y.U.  Press  1982).
Citations have been reformatted  to conform to the ALWD Citation Manual.
**  Robert Walmsley University Professor, Harvard University.
1.  See  Frank  I.  Michelman,  A  Comment on Some  Uses and  Abuses  of Economics  in Law,  46  U.
Chi. L. Rev. 307  (1979)  [hereinafter  Michelman, Comment on Uses and Abuses]; Frank  I.  Michelman,
Norms  and Normativity in  the  Economic  Theory of Law,  62  Minn.  L.  Rev.  1015,  1043-45  (1978)
[hereinafter Michelman,  Norms and Normativity]; Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis
of the  Efficiency Norm  in  Common  Law Adjudication, 8  Hofstra  L.  Rev.  487  (1980)  [hereinafter
Posner, Efficiency Norm]; Richard A. Posner, Some Uses and Abuses of  Economics in Law, 46 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 281,292 (1979)  [hereinafter Posner, Uses and Abuses].
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much  such satisfaction  as nature's  immutable  laws permit.2  The weak premises of
rationality  and efficiency  are, however,  insufficient to determine  an ideal form of
property  law.  The  efficiency  of private property  is a  hypothesis  dependent,  not
only  on  behavior  rationally  directed  toward  satisfying  individual  wants,  but  on
questions  about  the contents  of  the  wants  and  the  social  propensities  of  their
bearers-some  of which  may be empirically  determinable,  while others  can only
be imputed through moral intuition or moral reason.
The  extreme  counterthesis  to  this  essay's  is  what  we  may  call  the
presumptive efficiency  thesis (PET).  It is important to see that PET, at its best, is
not itself insensitive  to contingencies  of actual  wants  and  proclivities.  PET may
well  regard  private  property  (PP),  not  as  a  unique  order  having  detailed
specifications,  but as  a set of orders  sharing the same  general form, within  which
the details  can vary while  the form remains clearly opposed  to that of obviously
non-PP orders  such as  collective  ownership  or  an unregulated  "state  of nature."
PET, then,  would  be  the notion that  efficiency  is both a general  and  a  peculiar
virtue  of the PP form-general  in the  sense  that  efficiency  is  presumptively  an
attribute  of the PP form as  such, as applied to whatever domain  of valued objects
you like; peculiar in the sense that given any particular domain, and any proposed
regime  for ordering  it that is identifiably not PP, there  is always presumed  to be
some  PP way that  is more  efficient than  the proposed  alternative  (the  details of
which  will depend on the special  facts pertaining to actual wants and proclivities).
The claim here is that PET is false even in this most reasonable, highly adaptable
version.
II.  COMPARING FORMS OF REGIMES
FOR PRESUMPTIVE  EFFICIENCY
A.  The Private Property Torso
To  think  of private  property  regimes  (PP)  as  presumptively  efficient  is,  it
seems,  to  have  at  least  vaguely  in  mind  an  ideal  type  of PP-an  institutional
paradigm to which actual regimes  may be observed to conform or not.
Some  elements of the  PP form are  easy  to  identify.  Any legal  order must
contain both rules  governing initial acquisition by  agents in  the order  of use  and
control  of  valued  objects,  and  rules  governing  reassignment from  one  agent  to
another.3  In  a "private  property"  order, it  will be readily agreed,  the  rules must
conform to at least the following principles:
2.  There  is,  of  course,  a  very  controversial  ambiguity  as  between  the  norm  of  collective
maximization  (utilitarianism)  and that of universal "maximization"  (paretianism).  We can avoid that
controversy here  by way of a benign pretense  that these two versions  of efficiency  come practically  to
the same  thing,  on the principle  of the bigger the pie,  the bigger  the slices.  See generally Lucian A.
Bebchuk,  The Pursuit of a Bigger Pie: Can Everyone Expect a Bigger Slice?, 8 Hofstra  L.  Rev. 671
(1980);  Frank  I.  Michelman, Constitutions, Statutes, and the Theory of Efficient Adjudication, 9 J.  Leg.
Stud. 431, 435-40 (1980);  Posner, Efficiency Norm, supra n. 1.
3.  Rules  regarding  adverse  possession  or user that eventuates  in  both obliteration  of an old title
and inception of a new one are treated in this chapter as belonging to the "initial acquisition" category.
[Vol. 39:663
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Initial  Acquisition
1.  Sole ownership: The rules must allow  that at least some  objects of utility
or desire can be fully owned by just one person.  To be "full owner" of something
is  to  have  complete  and  exclusive  rights and  privileges over  it-the  "rights"
meaning  that  others  are  legally  required  to  leave  the  object  alone  save  as  the
owner  may permit, and the  "privileges"  meaning  that the owner  is legally free to
do with the object as he or she wills.
4
2.  Self-ownership: The rules must prescribe that each individual is full owner
of his or her natural body, talents, and labor power.
3.  Ownership of product: The rules must prescribe that whoever owns all the
factor  inputs  to  any  product  owns  the  product.  (Rules  governing  cases  of
production  using factors  owned by  more than one person must be designed so as
to reinforce actual social respect for property in factors.)
Reassignment
4.  Freedom  of  transfer:  Owners  are  both  immune  from  involuntary
deprivation  or modification  of their ownership  rights and  empowered  to transfer
their rights to others at will, in whole or in part.
B.  Private Property  Compared With What?
We need some reasonably  clear  conceptions  of regimes  that  are  decidedly
not PP, with which PP regimes can be compared for presumptive efficiency.  It will
be convenient to have three of these before us:
1.  State of nature (SON).  In a state-of-nature  (SON) regime there are never
any exclusionary rights.  All is privilege.  People are legally free to do as they wish,
and  are  able  to do, with whatever  objects  (conceivably  including  persons)  are in
the SON.'
2.  Regulatory regime (REG).  The converse  of SON  is  a regulatory regime
(REG),  in which everyone  always has rights respecting the objects  in the regime,
and  no  one,  consequently,  is  ever  privileged  to  use  any  of  them  except  as
particularly  authorized  by  the  others.6  (Rules  for  determining  when  such
authorization  exists may vary  along several  axes.  At  one extreme,  authorization
would  require  near-simultaneous  unanimous  consent;  tending  toward  the  other
extreme would be a rule defining authorization  as expressions of consent from any
two persons  occurring  within  the same  twelve-month  time span.  The  latter rule
constitutes  an  REG:  under  it,  each  person  always  has  a  right  that  each  of  the
others  shall  leave  the  covered  objects  alone  except  insofar  as  authorization  is
obtained.)
4.  It is an open question whether  the notion of full  ownership must encompass entitlement  to be
compensated for unintended or otherwise  "excusable"  harm to things owned.  See Duncan  Kennedy &
Frank Michelman, Are Property  and Contract  Efficient?, 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 711,767-68  (1980).
5.  Compare id. at 754-55.
6.  Compare id. at 755-56.
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3.  Forced sharing for  needs  (FSN).  SON  and  REG  both  distinguish
themselves  from  PP  by  strongly  negating  the  PP  principle  of  sole  ownership.
Forced sharing  for needs (FSN)  instead  attacks the PP principle of ownership of
one's product.  An FSN regime always resembles  some counterpart  version of PP,
departing  from  the  PP  counterpart  only  in  the  following  feature:  anyone  who
"needs"  a thing and doesn't have it (or its equivalent in cash or credit)  may take or
requisition it from anyone else who  has it and doesn't "need"  it, and the state will
intervene,  if necessary,  on the  side of the needy  taker.  (For convenience,  let us
imagine rules clearly defining "need"  in objective terms referring only to currently
observable states of affairs.  These may  define "need"  quite broadly-e.g., having
in one's possession  at this moment  less than two  thirds of the per capita  average
share  of privately  held national  wealth-or  quite narrowly-e.g.,  being diabetic
and lacking insulin for an overdue shot.)
C.  Controlling  for Distribution  and Rights
Calling  private  property  presumptively  efficient  makes  sense  only  as  a
statement that, for any given non-PP regime, there is probably some workable PP
regime that, while otherwise equivalent, is more efficient.  We have begun to form
some  rough  idea  of the  meaning  of  PP  and  non-PP.  But what  does  the  term
"otherwise  equivalent" mean?
Surely  one  might  have  grounds  other  than  comparative  efficiency  for
choosing  among  regimes.  A  regime  might  be  preferred  for  the  sake  of  its
expected  distributional  outcomes,  or  because  it  conforms  to  extraeconomic
conceptions of rights.  Such concerns  might immediately dictate the choice among
regimes without regard to efficiency comparisons; or efficiency comparisons might
be relevant  but  not necessarily  controlling,  given  some  "social  welfare  function"
that specifies the form and rate of exchange7  among efficiency and other concerns.
We  need  some  conceptual  apparatus  by  which  to  control  for  possible
concerns  about  distribution  and  rights,  and  so  keep  our  comparisons  among
regimes (or classes thereof) strictly focused on efficiency.  We need, in particular,
to make  sure  that  preferences  for PP vis-A-vis  SON, REG,  or FSN,  even  when
experienced  or  expressed  as  if  motivated  by  efficiency  concerns,  are  not  really
grounded in some other dimension of morality.
The appropriate set of controls is not hard to discover.  We first assume that
we have an adequate definition of the PP and non-PP categories.  Next, we assume
a distributional criterion, D, that specifies the set of acceptable distributions,  and a
rights  criterion, R,  that specifies  the form and  rate  of exchange  (which  might,  of
course, be that of lexical  superiority) of various rights with efficiency.  Finally, we
assume  knowledge of the natural facts  and laws that determine the most efficient
specification  of the PP form that is compatible  with both D and R.  This excellent
regime we call PP*.
7.  The  preferred  form  and  rate  of  exchange  may  be  hierarchical  rather  than  continuously
substitutive-a  lexical  ordering.  Compare  Ronald  Dworkin,  Why  Efficiency?:  A  Response  to
Professors  Calabresi  and Posner,  8 Hofstra L. Rev. 563 (1980).
[Vol. 39:663
4
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 39 [2003], Iss. 3, Art. 10
http://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol39/iss3/102004]  ETHICS, ECONOMICS,  AND THE LAW OF PROPERTY  667
We  can  use  the  expression  PP  to stand  for  any  class  of  regimes  that  are
certainly  not PP.  By analogy  with  PP*,  PP* designates  any non-PP regime  that
satisfies both D and R.  PET, then, is tantamount to the view that (i) there exists at
least one instance  of PP*-at least one  possible non-PP regime that, given all the
other supposed facts about the world, will in practice  allow for due recognition  of
all the rights in R and yield distributions compatible  with D; and (ii)  for every such
PP*,  it  is the case that (or there is reason to think it likely that) there is a possible
PP*  that is more efficient.  It is of central importance  to the aims of this chapter to
understand  that PET entails not only point (ii),  but point (i)  as well.  If you think
(i)  is  false, you  are  committed  to  PP  on grounds  that  have  nothing  to  do with
efficiency.  You are, moreover,  committed  to rejecting PET insomuch  as PET  is
the  thesis  that  PP  regimes  are  presumptively  more  efficient  than  otherwise
equivalent PP  regimes;  because  whatever  the  term  "otherwise  equivalent"  might
mean,  it  seemingly  cannot  encompass  regimes  that  fail,  where  PP  succeeds,  in
securing distributional or noneconomic rights.
Thus, if R  is such as directly to require establishment of sole ownership  (thus
ruling  out  SON  and  REG),  or  directly  to  condemn  any  nEeds-based
redistributions  of product (thus  ruling out  FSN), then  a preference  for PP*  over
SON,  REG,  or  FSN  is fully  determined  by  these  extraeconomic  considerations,
and efficiency is beside the point of the comparisons.  Again, if the supposed  facts
are  such  that  SON  simply  cannot  be  constrained  (while  still  remaining  a
cognizable  version  of SON)  so as  to generate  a  D-compatible  distribution,  then
rejection of SON in favor of PP*  is fully determined by a preference  for a certain
range of distributional outcomes, and efficiency  is beside the point.
III.  THE COMPOSITION PRINCIPLE  OF THE PP FORM
A.  The Question of Composition
The four "torso"  principles of sole ownership, self-ownership,  ownership  of
product, and freedom  of transfers  are not by themselves sufficient  to characterize
regimes  that  are  recognizably  and  distinctively  PP.  Also  needed  are  rules
governing  the  composition  of  allowable  ownership  claims-or,  as  it  might  be
described,  for  "packaging" 9 marketable  goods  into legally  cognizable  objects  of
ownership.  A few illustrations will confirm the need.
Take first the case  of airspace  overlying  the earth's  surface.  Is that  legally
subdivisible  at  all?  Is  it  subdivisible,  but  only  into  sole  exclusive  ownership
domains along this or that configuration  of space-time coordinates-for  example,
by a rule that assigns to the owner of a  surface parcel sole exclusive  ownership of
8.  See text accompanying  supra  nn. 3-4.
9.  See Bruce A. Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal  State 170 (Yale  U. Press 1980).  Ackerman
is  directly  concerned  with  the  composition  problem  as  it  pertains  to  individual  versus  collective
ownership, but not with other dimensions of the problem we are about to discuss.
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the  superadjacent  space?1°  Or  might  the  subdivision  occur  along  different
conceptual  axes?  For  example,  we  distinguish  "rights"  (of  exclusion)  from
"privileges"  (of  entry  and  use),  and  then  assign  to  each  individual  "sole
ownership"  of  a  privilege  over  the  whole  spherical  envelope  (namely,  I  am  the
sole owner of my world-encompassing privilege in that I alone determine how and
when  I exercise  it)-with the result,  by deduction,  that  no one  initially has  any
exclusionary  rights.  Or,  conversely,  we  assign  to  each  individual  an  all-
encompassing right, so that it becomes  true for each  that no other is free to enter
or  act  within  the  envelope  without  the  permission  of  the former-and  no  one,
therefore, initially has any privileges."
Without at  this point saying anything  stronger,  we  can safely conclude  that
the PP form must require some restriction on decomposition of full ownership into
privileges  held  without their congruent  rights, or rights  without  their congruent
privileges.  A regime  totally  void  of such  restrictions  could  hardly  count  as  PP,
because  a  scheme  of  universally  distributed,  all-encompassing  privilege  is,
precisely, a commons, a type of regime (SON) that is opposite to PP if any type is;
whereas  the converse scheme of universally distributed,  all-encompassing  rights is
just an extreme of collectivization  (REG) no less starkly opposed to PP than is the
state of nature; and schemes that  go part way to either  of those  extremes  will be
cognizable,  then,  not as pure PP, but as mixtures of PP and something  else.
12  To
be the  full owner of something just  is to be, at once, the one  who  is both legally
free to occupy  and enjoy it and legally authorized to say what anyone  else may do
with it.
Further  compositional  ambiguity  yet  lurks  in  the  notion  of  "something,"
even  if we  strongly  rule  out  of PP all  regimes  that countenance  any  degree  of
right/privilege  decomposition.  Are  "objects"  restricted  to  entities  describable
using  spatial  coordinates?  using  space-time  coordinates?  to  members  of  some
discernible  typology  of natural wholes?  Do  all  such entities  qualify  as  ownable
objects? Examples of the various questions crowd to mind: May it be that I am the
owner of a certain ten-acre  field on odd-numbered  days, while you own it the rest
of the time? 1 3  May it be that I own, continuously  and forever, one half of the field
while you own the other half-but our halves are spatially configured like the red-
and-black  halves  of  a  checkerboard,  and  the  blocks  are  each  one  centimeter
10.  Such  was professedly  the  traditional rule  of  the common  law.  See  e.g.  Charles  Donahue, Jr.,
Thomas  E.  Kauper  &  Peter  W.  Martin,  Cases  and  Materials on  Property: An  Introduction to  the
Concept and the Institution 359-81  (West 1974).
11.  For  fuller  discussion  of  the  concepts  of  right  and privilege,  and of the  contradictory  relation
between them, see Kennedy & Michelman, supra note 4, at 752-56.
12.  See id. at 755-56, 766-67.
13.  The traditional common  law rules allow for division of ownership along temporal lines, i.e.,  into
"present"  and  "future"  "estates."  See e.g. Donahue  et al.,  supra n.  10, at 541-60.  The  rules do not,
however, permit unrestricted  temporal subdivision  ad libitum, but only subdivision according  to some
one of a finite set of recognized patterns.  See Johnson v. Whiton, 34 N.E. 542 (Mass. 1893) (Holmes, J.:
"A  man  cannot  create  a  new  kind  of  inheritance.");  Donahue  et  al.,  supra n.  10, at  541-60.  The
alternating-days pattern proposed in the text is not among the recognized ones.
[Vol. 39:663
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square?
1 4 May  I own the whole  thing, permanently, as respects beet culture, while
you own all the rest? 5  May I own the toothpaste while you own the tube?
1 6  Note
that  all of these  may be construed  as  questions both about the  regime's rules for
initial  acquisition  (e.g.,  may  I  be  allowed  to  acquire  just  the  beet-raising
"easement"  by  "first  occupancy"?),  and  its rules  for  reassignment  (e.g.,  may  I,
fully  owning  the tube  of toothpaste,  make  A  the  owner  of  the  tube  and  B  the
owner of the paste?)
B.  Composition Constraints  on PP
It will  now be  apparent why the torso  principles  do not  constitute  a  set of
sufficient  conditions  to  qualify  regimes  as  PP  or  not-PP,  for  purposes  of
presumptive-efficiency  comparisons  between  the  two  classes.  A  regime  that
reserved  all industrial  capital  to collective  ownership  or defined  all the  land as  a
commons  of  universal  privilege,  which  would  qualify  as  PP  under  the  torso
principles,  would  not  so  qualify  in  presumptive-efficiency  talk.  For  sufficient
definition  of a  PP category suitable to presumptive-efficiency  discourse,  we  need
some principle  or principles of composition  stronger than those implicit in torso 1
(some objects have to be fully owned  by individuals  at least initially)  and torso 4
(owners can subdivide their holdings).
As one  speculates on the  matter, there  seem to  be  at least  four candidate
composition  principles  for  distinguishing  presumptively  efficient  PP  regimes,
which  we  can call  the principles  of ad hoc efficiency (composition  rules are fixed
from  time  to  time  with  a  view  to  efficiency  in  light  of  current  knowledge  of
individual  wants  and  proclivities);  mandatory  sole  ownership  (no  privileges
unaccompanied  by congruent rights, or vice versa, can  be initially acquired and/or
reassigned);  internalization  (holdings  are configured  according to rules set with  a
view  to  coordination  without  need  for  large-number  transactions);  and
nonintervention (no  state  ownership  or  state  dictation  of composition  in  initial
acquisition or reassignment).
The first two candidates can be rather quickly disposed of.
14.  Nothing  in  the  common  law  rules  inveighs  against  a  checkerboard  subdivision,  despite  its
obvious  tendency  toward  economic  inconvenience.  Compare Leo Sheep  Co.  v.  U.S.,  440  U.S.  668
(1979).
15.  Such  an  arrangement  can  perhaps  be  approximated  under  the  common  law  rules,  using
recognized ownership categories of "easement in gross"  and "profit-a-prendre,"  see e.g. Donahue et al.,
supra  n.  10, at 1028-63, or those of "fee  simple on a condition subsequent," see e.g. id. at 546-47, 581-82,
or "fee  simple subject  to a restrictive  covenant."  See e.g. id. at 1102-48.  There is a question, however,
about the degree of permanency that is legally attainable  by such arrangements.  See e.g. id. at 703-10,
1057-63,  1096-1101,  1170-78.
16.  It seems we can make such  an arrangement  if we are careful  about it, although  some degree of
hostility toward proprietary  separation of the functionally inseparable  is expressed  in the common law
doctrines  of "accession"  and  "confusion,"  for which see generally  Ray Andrews  Brown,  The  Law of
Personal  Property ch. 6  (2d ed., Callaghan & Co. 1955).
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1.  Ad Hoc Efficiency
As  a  composition  principle  for  distinguishing  PP  orders  from  others  for
purposes  of presumptive-efficiency  comparison,  that  of periodically  revising  the
regime's composition rules with a view to efficiency  would be merely illusory.  The
ad  hoc  principle  cannot  distinguish  between  private  property  and,  say,  "market
socialism."  It  just  restates  the  problem  that  sent  us  looking  for  a  "strong"
principle of PP composition.
2.  Mandatory Sole Ownership
The conceptually  cleanest  way  to demarcate  PP from the classes  of regimes
perceived  as  opposite  to  it  is  just  to  rule  out  of  PP  the  kinds  of  entitlement
configurations  that  seem definitional  for  the non-PP  classes-that  is,  privileges
without  congruent  rights  that  characterize  a  commons,  and  rights  without
congruent  privileges  that  characterize  a  collective.  (Under  this  principle  of
mandatory sole ownership, PP regimes could  still exhibit a variety of composition
rules.  For example,  a  regime  might  have  a rule  allowing privileges  to  enter  the
airspace envelope to be chopped  into arbitrarily tiny spatiotemporal  bits, or a rule
assigning the privilege respecting the entire earth's envelope  to just one person, or
a  rule  assigning  the  privilege  in  a  sector  of the  envelope  to the  owner  of  the
adjacent  surface7-and  any  of  those  regimes  would  qualify  as  PP  as  long  as
whoever had a privilege also always had the congruent exclusionary right.)
The  trouble  with  mandatory  sole  ownership  as  a  composition  principle  for
presumptively  efficient PP regimes isn't, then, that the principle fails to distinguish
among  regimes,  but  that  it  fails  to  describe  a  regime  that  is  either  plausibly
efficient  or  much  like  the  modified  common-law  regime  we  know  as  "private
property."  As  applied  to  initial  acquisition, the  sole-ownership  principle  would
imply  that our own  law  has been  presumptively  inefficient  when  it  has  assigned
the high seas and navigable  airspace as free transit  zones over which there are  no
exclusive  rights;1
8  or has prescribed  that streams  and  lakes were  subject  to rights
held jointly  by all the riparian owners, none of whom was privileged to deplete or
pollute the  water  without permission  from  all  the others; 19  or  even when  it has
imposed  less  than  absolute  liability  for  harm  inflicted  by  one  upon  legally
cognizable interests of another, by allowing such defenses as due care, emergency,
duress, and  fair competition.'o  As applied  to reassignment,  the  principle  would
imply  that  individuals  have  acted  inefficiently  when  they  have  privately  and
17.  I.e., the common law rule.  See supra n.  10.
18.  See e.g. Air Commerce Act  of 1926,  Pub.  L. No. 69-254,  44  Stat. 568  (1976)  (as  amended,  49
U.S.C. § 403); Ill. C. R.R. Co. v. Ill., 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
19.  Such  was  the  traditional  English  ("natural  flow")  rule.  In  the  eastern  United  States  it  was
generally  supplanted  by  a  rule  allowing each  riparian  to  make  "reasonable  use"  of  the  flow  (most
characteristically,  for modest domestic  uses) despite  resulting  harm to co-riparians.  See e.g. Donahue
et al., supra n. 10, at 392-99.  In either version ("natural flow" or "reasonable use"), the riparian  system
is one  of right/privilege  decomposition:  "natural  flow"  is  a  system  of joint rights  without  privileges,
while "reasonable  use" is a combination of such a system with one  of common privilege without rights.
20.  See Kennedy &  Michelman, supra n. 4, at 767-68.
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unanimously  agreed to pool their several landholdings in a recreation area open to
the free use of all, or to subject their holdings to a regime of collective  controls on
use and development. 21 It is safe to conclude that mandatory sole ownership is too
strong  a  composition  constraint  for  presumptively  efficient  PP.  We  need
something less inflexible, though still tougher than the ad hoc efficiency principle.
3.  Internalization
a.  Composition and Costs of Coordination
Before  proceeding  to study  of  the  third  and  fourth  candidate  composition
principles  for  the  PP  form-namely  those  of  internalization  and
nonintervention-it  will be in order to examine  the relation between composition
and efficiency.
Given  a society containing a large number of individuals, a stock of available
resources,  and  a  distribution  among  the  individuals  of  the  society's  aggregate
resource  wealth,  there  is  at  least  one  "efficient"  scheme  of deployment  of the
various  resources  such  that  no alternative  deployment  could  make  each  person
better  off even  after  compensatory  side  payments.  Let  us call  such  an  optimal
allocative scheme S*.
Let us say that the society  would benefit from  "coordination"  whenever it is
the case that  S*  does not actually obtain  (some resources being either idle or used
contrary  to  the  dictates  of  S*).  Coordination  always  entails  some  direct
("transaction")  costs,  and  the  existence  of  those  costs  always  leads  to  some
shortfall  from  perfect  coordination:  the  coordinating  society  always  to  some
degree  approaches  S*22  and  never  attains  it.  The  value  of the  shortfall  is  the
society's "deadweight  loss"; and the total of the deadweight  loss and direct costs of
coordination  is the society's economic  waste.  From the standpoint  of a concern
for efficiency, the object of composition rules is minimizing economic waste.23
b.  Internalization
Suppose  that  all  the  available  resources  are  owned  in  common  by  each
member of the society,  so that no coordination  at all-much less a close approach
to S*-is possible  without the formal concurrence  or spontaneous  cooperation  of
everyone  at  once.  Now  suppose,  alternatively,  that  there  is  at  least  one
21.  E.g., through the common law devices of easement, covenant, and equitable servitude.  See e.g.
Donahue et al., supra n. 10, at 1102-65; Bernard H.  Siegan, Land Use without Zoning 33-84 (Lexington
Bks. 1972).
22.  An inconsequential qualification  is required  by the theory of the second best, which tells us that
short  of  actual  attainment  of  S*,  successive  "approaches"  to  S*  may  involve  local  reversals  in  the
direction  of  adjustment  of  various  sectors  in  the  total  system  of  allocation.  See  e.g.  Richard  S.
Markovits,  A  Basic Structure for Microeconomic  Policy Analysis  in  Our Worse-Than-Second-Best
World: A  Proposal  and Related Critique of the Chicago Approach to the Study of Law and Economics,
1975 Wis.  L. Rev. 950.
23.  See  generally  Robert  C.  Ellickson,  Suburban  Growth  Controls: An  Economic and  Legal
Analysis, 86 Yale L.J. 385, 414-15  (1977).
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distributionally  acceptable  way  of  carving  up  the  resources  into  individual
holdings  in  severalty,  such  that  under  conditions  of  moderately  imperfect
information  and  moderately  costly communication  the  individual  holders  would
be motivated to transact  their way  stepwise toward  S*  by way of a series of small-
number contracts and exchanges.  It  is  true,  of'  course,  that  under  absolutely
perfect  information  and  costless  communications,  S*  would  emerge  out  of  the
ownership-in-common  regime  as  well.  But  in  moderately  imperfect  conditions,
the  amounts  of  economic  waste  respectively  attendant  upon  the  common-
ownership and several-ownership  regimes are likely to differ.
The composition principle of internalization  reflects a policy favoring several
as opposed to common ownership.  The principle  is  that the rules for composing
the  taxonomy  of legal  ownable  objects  must  be  designed  so  that, given  what is
known or believed about people's wants and proclivities and the resultant  utilities
attached to various classes of objects, action in accordance  with the rules will yield
actual  configurations  of  holdings  such  that  the  incidence  of  cases  in  which
coordination  requires  simultaneous  agreement  among  large  numbers  of  owners
will  be  held  to  a  feasible  minimum.  Using  internalization  as  the  composition
principle that qualifies a regime as PP, one would assign a regime to the PP class if
its rules  both conformed  to  the  torso  principles  and  seemed  aptly  designed  for
internalization.
The  strategy  of  internalization  is  to  arrange  matters  so  that  the  typical
owner, or most owners, will have as few "neighbors"  as possible.  A configuration
of  holdings  at  the  opposite  pole  from  perfect  internality,  that  is,  perfect
externality,  is  one  in  which  everyone  is  always  everyone  else's  neighbor:  each
person owning an undivided fractional share interest in every thing in the world.
Of course,  internality  is  perfect  only  in a world  entirely owned  by just one
owner.  That  possibility,  while  logically  conceivable,  is  not  widely  endorsed  as
policy.24   Still,  given  any  criterion  (D)2'  of  "widespreadness"  in  distribution,
internality  seems  to  posit  a  comprehensible  goal  toward  which  an  optimizing
intelligence can be coherently  directed.
Consider  this  example.26  A  large group  of people,  n  in number,  have  the
opportunity,  at no cost, to  acquire  an expanse  of beach  and subdivide  it among
themselves.  We assume  that, while  the total area  of their pending  acquisition is
fixed, they can take it  in any shape  they choose-circular, square, oblong, and so
forth.  They have already settled upon a scheme  of equal division by lottery into n
parcels  to  be  severally  and  exclusively  occupied  by individuals.  The  question
comes as to external  shape and internal configuration.  Just to keep things simple,
suppose  for  a  moment  that  only  two  alternatives  are  available:  a  row  of
rectangular holdings adding up to an extended oblong,
24.  To be clear, there is wide endorsement neither of the policy of extreme concentration of wealth
nor that of extreme concentration of management  authority over everything in the world.  See infra nn.
45-46.
25.  See supra  pt. II.C.
26.  Adapted  from  Philip  B.  Heymann,  The Problem of Coordination:  Bargaining and Rules,  86
Harv. L. Rev. 797, 800, 817, 831 et seq. (1973).
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or  a  honeycomb  of  regular  hexagonal  holdings  as  shown  in  the
accompanying  drawing.
etc.
It is  known, we suppose, that people  use  beach  space  for just  two different
purposes:  napping  and  listening  to  radios  (various stations).  Nappers  don't  like
radio  noise, and  those  listening  to one station  don't like the noise  from  another.
At the preferred volume levels, audible radio noise crosses over just one boundary
in  every  direction,  whichever  pattern-row  of  squares  or  nest  of hexagons-is
used.
A  property  system  committed  to  an  internalizing  composition  chooses  the
row-of-squares  design.  Under the hexagons alternative, each holder will be faced
with  the problem  of trying to  work  things  out, simultaneously,  with  each  of  six
neighbors,  each  of whom  also has  to  deal  at the  same  time  with  six  neighbors,
three  of them different  from the  neighbors of the first  holder,  and  so  on.  Very
possibly, some kind of global settlement through  a political process will be the best
available  solution (e.g.,  they will elect  a legislature that  will enact some temporal
and territorial regulations:  in the northeast sector only station A can be played; in
the north central, only station  B; in the southwest, no radio playing;  in others, the
day is carved up among different rules; and so on).  Under the squares alternative,
by contrast,  it  is quite  imaginable  that  a  chain  of bilateral  deals  (trading places,
sorting out time periods between  neighbors)  would  lead the parties  to a feasible
optimum.  The  preference  for  small-numbers  internality  reflects  an  assumption
that economic waste27 is lower  in these bilateral-chain  dealings then  in the global
political process.  (If the parties placed an absolute value on efficiency supposedly
27.  For the definition  of this term, see the text accompanying supra note 23.
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associated  with strict  bilaterality, such  that  they  were  willing  to  sacrifice  to that
end  their  distributional  preference  for  equal  holdings,  they  could  achieve  or
approach  bilaterality  by  allowing  one  of  their  number  to  become  sole  owner
[landlord]  of their entire beach site.  This owner would then lease out portions in
such sizes, shapes, and patterns, for such durations, and subject to such restrictions
on  radio playing,  as  seemed  apt to maximize  rental  revenues;  and so  a  chain of
bilateral deals could, again, emerge to lead the parties up Mt. Optimus.)
There is at least  some degree of plausibility in the idea that by adding to the
four  torso  principles  that  of an  internalizing  strategy  for  composition  rules,  we
capture  the  essence  of  the  PP  category  as  it  occurs  in  presumptive-efficiency
assessment.  This way of completing  the definition  of the PP form seems to  find
the economic  essence  of private  property,  fittingly  enough, in  what we  may  call
market  structure  aimed  at  accommodating  coordination  through  small-number
contracts and exchanges as opposed to political decision or extralegal cooperation.
Moreover,  the regime we  commonly know as private property  in fact  abounds  in
restrictions  on decomposition of titles that can be understood to reflect a policy of
internalization:  restrictive doctrines respecting easements in gross,28 perpetuities2 9
covenants  running  with  the  land,3°  restraints  on  alienation,3  duration  of  co-
32  33 tenancies,"  "novel"  easements  and  estates,  to name just  some  of the  pertinent
technicalities of the land law.  Scholars34 and judges3 5  have associated  many of the
restrictive  doctrines  with  efficiency  goals.  To  be  sure,  there  may  be  plausible
accounts of many of them, or perhaps all, that make no appeal to efficiency.1
6  Yet
it  would be folly to insist that none is,  as a  matter of fact, conducive  to efficiency
whether designedly or accidentally.
37
4.  Nonintervention
Now,  it  is  an  unfortunate  but  inescapable  complication-not  to  say  an
embarrassment-to  our  project  of  defining  the  essential  form  of  supposedly
efficient  PP  that  the  internalization  principle  for  composition  rules  is  not  only
market structuring, but also market hindering.  It is market hindering  insomuch as
28.  See e.g. Donahue et al., supra n.  10, at 1053-63.
29.  See e.g. id. at 686-71.
30.  See e.g. id. at 1114-38.
31.  See e.g. id. at 667-78.
32.  E.g. Clark v.  Clark, 58 A. 24  (Md.  1904)  (refusing to enforce  a  stipulation, in a gift  of land to
seven  persons  as  tenants-in-common,  that  the  usual  recourse  of  tenants-in-common  to  judicially
supervised  partition would be suspended for ten years).
33.  See e.g. Alfred F. Conard, Easement Novelties, 30 Cal. L.  Rev. 125 (1942); supra n. 13.
34.  E.g. Myres Smith McDougal  & David Haber, Property, Wealth, Land: Allocation, Planning  and
Development 246-51,  479-83 (Michie Casebook Corp. 1948).
35.  E.g.  N.W.  Real Est.  Co.  v.  Serio,  144  A.  245,  247-48  (Md.  1928)  (Bond,  C.J.,  dissenting);
Norcross v. James, 2 N.E. 946 (Mass.  1885)  (Holmes, J.).
36.  For  example,  the  Rule  Against  Perpetuities  is often  explained  as motivated  by  a  concern  for
intergenerational  equity, or for countering social stratification arising out of long-lasting concentrations
of wealth  within particular  families.  See  e.g. Lewis  M. Simes  &  Allan F.  Smith,  The  Law of Future
Interests § 1117 (2d ed., West 1956).
37.  See Kennedy & Michelman, supra n. 4, at 764, 767.
[Vol. 39:663
12
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 39 [2003], Iss. 3, Art. 10
http://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol39/iss3/102004]  ETHICS, ECONOMICS,  AND THE LAW OF PROPERTY  675
it calls for composition rules at all.  Internalization  policy is, precisely, the policy of
frustrating  private parties  bent upon  excessive  decomposition.  And vet it seems
hard to deny that market freedom-the absence  of economic  policy control by the
state-is  also  of  the  essence  of  the  PP  category  in  comparative-efficiency
discourse.
We  have  to  consider,  then,  the  possibility  of  defining  the  PP  form  as
consisting of the torso principles  plus a fifth to the effect that the state simply does
not mandate or restrict composition (and,  by deduction, never is an owner itself).38
In this noninterventionist  or antistatist conception  of PP, all objects  of' utility  or
desire  must  at all  times  be  either  in private  ownership  (sole  or multiple,  full  or
divided,  as  the  parties  determine)  or  be  unowned  because  lost,  abandoned,
undiscovered  or  unoccupied.  If  unowned,  they  may  be  taken  into  private
ownership  by  occupation  (or  its  analogues  such  as  invention  or  creation);39  if
owned,  they  may  nevertheless  be  taken  into  new  ownership  by  prescription  or
adverse  possession;  and  in  either  case  the  occupier  or prescriber  becomes  the
owner of just what he took, bounded by whatever spatial, temporal, and functional
limits  actually  describe  his  legally  operative,  possessory  acts.  Aside  from
occupation  and prescription,  the only way to become  the owner of anything  is by
voluntary exercise of some erstwhile owner's power of alienation; and such powers
may  be exercised  ad libitum to  decompose  or recompose  titles.  For  example:  I
may, over an extended period of time, regularly  but nonexclusively, shoot skeet on
Mondays  and  Fridays  on  blocks  of your  field  configured  like  the  red  part  of a
checkerboard;  and I  shall thereby acquire  a nonexclusive checkerboard  easement
41 (privilege)  of Monday/Friday skeet-shooting.  Or you might confer just the same
title on me  by voluntary  grant.  Obviously, the  resulting  composition  might  be a
severe impediment to future coordination.
5.  Reconciling  the Principles of Internalization  and Nonintervention
Both  internalization  and nonintervention  seem  to be  of the  essence  of the
putatively  efficient private property form  for regimes.  Yet, as  we  have just seen,
the  two  principles  have  contradictory  implications.  The problem  now  is  how to
give each principle  its due in the definition  of the PP form, without destroying the
coherence of the notion of "private property" as a distinct class of legal orders.
The  most straightforward  solution  is  to include  both  principles  in  the  PP
definition, but  to give them separate  domains  of application.  Cleanest, perhaps,
would be  to make internalization  a principle  for  rules governing  the  composition
38.  State ownership  is  a form  of state-mandated  decomposition,  insomuch as there is no  individual
who  has  coextensive  rights  and  privileges  respecting  state-owned  objects.  Compare  the  case  of
corporations discussed infra note 45.
39.  Compare Richard A. Epstein, Possession  As the Root of Title, 13 Ga. L. Rev. 1221  (1979).
40.  For the  approximately  similar  common  law doctrines  of adverse  possession  and  prescriptive
easement, see, for example, Donahue et al., supra  note  10, at 100-140.
41.  A  common  law  court  undoubtedly  would  require  clear  and strong  evidence  of an  obviously
regular  pattern  of  implicitly  assertive  conduct  before  it  would  recognize  such  an  economically
vexatious prescriptive easement.  See e.g. id. at 108-09, 130-32.
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of  entitlements  at  the  point  of  initial  acquisition  and  nonintervention  the
composition  principle  for rules  governing  reassignment.  Thus,  the  taxonomy  of
titles that could be gained by occupation,  adverse possession, and so on would be
composed  according  to  rules  designed  to  minimize  the  cases  in  which  large-
42
number transactions  would be needed  for coordination  thenceforward,  whereas
the  rules  governing  reassignment  would  deal  with  such  matters  as  formality,
disclosure,  and  duress  but  leave  decomposition  and  recomposition  of  titles
unregulated, to be determined at will by the parties to the reassignments.
This separate-domains solution, while conceptually neat, is unsatisfactory.  It
plainly fails to describe the  traditional  "private property" legal  order, which both
allows  decomposition  by  initial  acquisition 43  and  substantially  regulates
decomposition  by reassignment."  Moreover, the separate-domains  solution is far
from making  intuitive economic  sense.  If decomposition  hinders coordination, it
does so whether arising from initially acquisitive party activity or from the activity
of reassignment.
The  more  satisfying  if  less  determinate  solution  is  best  approached  by
dwelling for a moment on the economic rationale  of the nonintervention  principle
for composition rules.  Nonintervention is a principle tending toward efficiency  in
composition just insofar  as it is true that the configurations of holdings  arrived at
via the nondirected, spontaneous acts  of individuals (consisting of first occupancy,
exchange,  gift  transfer, and  the  like)  will  always or generally  lend  themselves  to
cheaper coordination  than  will  configurations  dictated  or regulated  by the state.
Now, the truth  of that premise  seems  to depend  on that of  one  or both of two
subpremises-a  first regarding  the comparative  tendencies  of regimes  to depart
from  the  entitlement  structures  that  would  actually  be  amenable  to  least-cost
coordination  under  the  transient  circumstances;  a  second  regarding  the
comparative cost of correcting for the departures.
The  first  subpremise  is  that  the  self-interested  acts  and  dealings  of
individuals, whether  or not they "decompose"  ownership, will  leave the  universe
of holdings from time to time configured more  aptly for easy coordination  in the
service of individual wants than will the dictates of the state.  (A dramatic example
might  be  the  very  sophisticated  decompositions  of  sole  ownership  by  which
aggregations  of factors  are  gathered  under  the  unified  control  of a  corporation
management  without  directly  disturbing  the  wide  dispersion  of wealth  claims.4 5)
42.  E.g., one who acquires title  to a parcel of land by adverse  possession might take it (i) subject to
the privileges of others to interfere  accidentally and nonnegligently  with its use and enjoyment; or (ii)
subject  to  the liability that intentional or unreasonable  interference  may  not  be enjoinable  but  only
compensable  by  a damages award.  See generally Guido  Calabresi  & A.  Douglas Melamed,  Property
Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,  85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089 (1972).
43.  E.g., the doctrine of prescriptive easement, supra note 40.
44.  See text accompanying supra nn. 28-33.
45.  The corporation  is,  of course,  well recognized  as an "internalization"  device.  That  the device
works  by  complex  decomposition  rather than  unification  of  individual  ownership  claims  is  clear, if
perhaps  not so widely recognized.  It is of the essence of "corporate"  ownership that no individual has
coextensively broad rights and privileges  respecting the objects "in"  such ownership.  Directors can act
with  regard  to  them  only  collectively;  neither  directors  nor  officers  are  privileged  to  use  them
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This  subpremise  does  have  some  intuitive  appeal,  insomuch  as  the  wants  and
interests of individuals  are seen  as both generating  the configuration  and  calling
for the coordination  of its elements.  But there seems to  be no reason  to suppose
that the same individual interests  and wants are doing both  things, and there's the
rub.  The acts and dealings that continuously reassign  and redivide holdings are, to
be  sure, those of individuals;  but, to be  no less sure, those acts and  dealings  will
often  affect  multiple  third-party  interests,  either  immediately  (again,  the
concentration  and  redirection  of  resources  through  corporations  is  a  striking
example),  or  under  the unknown  conditions  of an  unfolding  future.  You  can't
very  easily get eggs out of an omelet.  The invisible hand is forever  becoming the
dead hand, as every property lawyer knows.46  And although  there is no reason to
confide  absolutely  in  either  the  beneficence  or  the  omniscience  of  the  state  as
regulator  of  property  composition,  there  is  also  none  for  trusting  more  to
accidental  regulation by  individual  dealings.  If the  state  does not  always  act  in
view of the economic interest of society as a whole, neither do individuals.
The second  subpremise  is that whatever the extant composition  of holdings
may  be, and  however  far that composition  may have  strayed  from  the one that
would  accommodate  least-cost  coordination  under  the  current  circumstances,
economic  waste  will  tend  to  be  less  if  individuals  are  left  free  to  recompose
entitlements  as  they  will  in  private  dealings  than  if composition  is  dictated  or
regulated  by  the  state.  Thus,  both subpremises  lead  to just  the  same  question
about the utility of state regulation of composition.
Posed thus abstractly, the question is unanswerable; or, rather, the inevitable
answer  to  the  abstract  question  is,  "sometimes  yes,  sometimes  no."  In  that
irreducibly ambivalent attitude toward state control of composition lies the answer
to our  search  for  a  composition  principle  to complete  the  definition  of the  PP
form.  The  PP  composition  principle  is  that  of  no-intervention-except-for-the-
sake-of-internalization, or what we may call the principle of market facilitation:  the
state  may  leave  composition  unregulated;  and  insofar  as  the  state  ever  does
regulate  composition,  it does  so  only  by  rules  that conform  to the  principle  of
internalization-that  is,  the  rules  are  designed  with  a  view  to  accommodating
coordination through small-number transactions.
It is important to note  how this composition  principle of market facilitation,
while  necessarily  weaker  than  the  rejected  principle  of  "mandatory  sole
ownership,47 is also enough  stronger than that of "ad hoc efficiency"  to escape the
objection that it fails to distinguish between regimes that are and are not pp.
48  It is
true that the principle of market facilitation,  like that of ad hoc efficiency,  allows
otherwise than as authorized by the charter and by votes of the directors; shareholders, who have rights
to prevent unauthorized uses of the objects, have no concomitant privileges of use; and so on.
46.  When  a given complex of "corporation ownership" claims has become inutile, by reason of scale
diseconomies,  monopolization,  or  whatever,  readjustment  is  fraught  with  heavy  transaction  costs,
whether  in  the  form  of  legally  compelled  "divestiture";  voluntary  "merger,"  "sale  of assets,"  or
"takeover";  or reassembly of sole ownership through "dissolution."
47.  See text accompanying supra nn. 17-21.
48.  Supra pts.  11I.B.1 & III.B.2.
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the  possibility  of  decoupled  privileges  and  rights. 4 9  It  allows  that  possibility,
however, only under rules that aim at market facilitation.  It does not countenance
rules that aim directly  at efficiency,  by avoidance  of markets.  Unlike  the ad hoc
principle, the principle  of market  facilitation  excludes  the possibility  that a state-
imposed commons, or a regime of state command or regulation, may sometimes be
preferable  to  a  market.  This  preference  for  markets,  it  seems,  is  one
distinguishing  mark  of the putatively efficient PP class  of regimes;  another is the
nonintervention bias.
We are  now, at  last,  in  a  position  to  set forth  the complete  set  of formal
principles for PP regimes:
Principles  Governing  Initial  Acquisition
1.  Self-ownership: The  rules must  prescribe  that  each  individual  is  full
owner of his or her natural body, talents, and labor power.
2.  Ownership of product: The rules must prescribe that whoever  owns  all
the factor inputs  to any product  owns the product.  Rules governing cases of
production  using  factors  owned  by more  than one person must be  designed
so as to reinforce actual social respect for property in factors.
3.  Market  facilitating  composition:
(a)  internalization  bias: Composition of holdings  may  be regulated  only
by  rules  designed  to  avoid  excessive  dependence  of coordination  on large-
number transactions.
(b)  nonintervention bias: Subject  only  to principle  3(a),  composition  of
holdings  by  initial  acquisition  is as  determined  by party action  under  rules
conforming to principles 1 and 2.
Principles  Governing Reassignment
4.  Nonexpropriation:  Owners  are  immune  from  involuntary  deprivation
or modification of their ownership rights.
5.  Market  facilitating  freedom of transfer:
(a)  free alienation:  Subject to principles 5(b),  (c), owners  are empowered
to transfer their ownership rights to others at will.
(b)  internalization  bias: Subdivision of holdings by  reassignment may  be
regulated,  but  only  by  rules  designed  to  avoid  excessive  dependence  of
coordination  on large-number transactions.
(c)  nonintervention bias: Subject  only to  principle  5(b),  composition  of
holdings  by  reassignment  is  as  determined  by  action  of the  parties  to  the
reassignment.
49.  See text accompanying supra nn. 10-12.
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IV.  THE "MORAL  BASIS"  OF PET 0
We are ready now to return to this chapter's central claim.  Take any R and
any D, and any corresponding PP* and PP,'  Then, from the sole factual postulate
that persons are rational maximizers of individual satisfactions, one cannot deduce
that  the  PP*  is-or  even  is  likely  to be-the  more  efficient  regime.  Such  a
deduction must depend always on additional factual or moral premises.
It  is  possible  to compile  a short list,  of additional  premises,  the truth of at
least one  of which would  be required  to make  the deduction true.  My aim is  to
show  that  the  additional  premises  are  either  (i)  false,  or  (ii)  quasi  empirical,
meaning that in the present state of knowledge  they are not known empirically to
be true and  are better understood  as moral propositions than as factual ones-as
statements of a view  about how things might  well be, not of how things are known
to be.
A.  Additional Premises
The list of additional premises is as follows:
a.  Per  Se Preferences  for Institutional  Roles, States, Experiences
1.  People prefer the role and  experience  of being  unmolested producers  to
those of  (i)  being predators  in a state  of nature or beneficiaries  of forced
sharing, and (ii) repulsing predators or fulfilling legal duties of sharing.
2.  With regard  to some specifiable  list of valued objects or experiences  (e.g.,
your  body,  or  having  total  command  over  what  you  produce),  people
prefer  the  state of being legally secure  in their own possessory  claims  to
that of being  legally free to disregard the  reciprocal, possessory  claims of
others. 2
3.  People prefer the experience of private exchange through markets to that
of public  decision  through  politics,  and  to  that  of  informal,  extralegal
cooperation.
50.  Compare  Lawrence  C. Becker, The Moral Basis of Property Rights, in NOMOS XXII: Property
187 (J. Roland Pennock  & John W. Chapman eds., N.Y.U. Press 1980).
51.  See supra pt. II.C.
52.  Note  that  the  list  must,  as  a  matter  of  logical  necessity,  exclude  some  of  the  objects  and
experiences  that people  might value.  This  is so  because  any subset of objects  and experiences  as  to
which  people  supposedly  prefer  a  state  of universal  security  necessarily  implies  a  complementary
subset as to which they supposedly prefer a state of universal exposure and license.  My having a secure
command  over your body,  labor,  and  product  is  not  logically  less  eligible  as  a  possible  object  of
preference than  is your contradictory  claim to self-possession.  Assuring secure self-possession to each
person  is  equivalent  to  (i)  denying  to  each  person  a  secure  claim  to anyone  else's  body,  labor,  or
product;  and  (ii)  licensing  each  person to disregard  or  interfere  at will  with  the claims  (and,  where
present,  the  related  needs)  described  in  (i).  For  more  elaborate  discussion,  see  Kennedy  &
Michelman, supra  n. 4, at 759-62.
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b.  Effect of Uncertainty,  Predation,  and Forced Sharing on Incentive and
Product
4.  Potential  producers,  anticipating  loss of product  to  legally  unrestrained
predation, regulation,  or forced  sharing, will  substitute for some  or all  of
the production  they otherwise would have undertaken some  combination
of  (i) leisure,  (ii)  production  in  less  predation-prone  or  less  shareable
form, and (iii)  other defensive  activity.
5.  Potential  producers,  allowed  by law  to  help  themselves  to the  fruits  of
other  people's  work  (whether  as  predators  or  forced  sharers),  will
substitute leisure for some  or all of the production they otherwise  would
have undertaken.
c.  Coordination  Behavior
6.  Failure  of  coordination,  through  information  failure  and  strategies  of
freeloading  and  bluffing,  will  be lesser  under  a  market process  in which
large  numbers  eventually  participate  through  complex  chains  of small-
number  deals  than under  a  political  process  of collective  decision  or an
extralegal process of voluntary cooperation.
This  chapter  proceeds  henceforth  on  the  assumption  that  belief  in  PET
requires belief in the truth of at least one  of the six additional premises.  I see no
way of proving the truth of this assumption.  I can only leave it to readers to show
the contrary,  if they can, by either (i) explaining  how to complete the defense  of
PET with nothing but the rational-maximizers  premise  to go on, or (ii)  supplying
some other additional premise that can do the job.
B.  The Additional  Premises as Quasi Empirical
1.  The Per Se Preferences
Let  us  take  first  the  three  premises  regarding  per  se  preferences  for
institutional states, roles, and  experiences.  Neither observation  nor introspection
has  established,  or  seems  likely  to, that  any  of them  is  universally  held;  to the
contrary, either common"  or  historical54 observation,  scientific  investigation,"  or
introspection  casts  grave  doubt  upon  the  idea that  any  of these  preferences  are
species-characteristic  in anything  like  a  universal sense.  And  once  it  is  granted
that some people may well have converse  preferences, any claim to knowledge of
53.  E.g., it seems obvious that some individuals choose to live on public assistance  who could expect
to attain a higher economic income if they worked.
54.  Historical  evidence of  preferences  for  political decision  modes can  be  found,  e.g.,  in Hannah
Arendt, On Revolution  (Greenwood  Press  1963).  Historical  evidence of preferences  for  reciprocity
and mutual  aid, as distinguished from market exchange, can be found, e.g., in Karl Polanyi, The Great
Transformation (Farrar & Rinehart 1944).
55.  For  one  recent  attempt  to  synthesize  relevant  implications  of  sociobiological  inquiry,  see
Edward 0.  Wilson, On Human Nature (Harv. U. Press 1978).
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how  the  balance  of  value  lies,  when  it  comes  to  choosing  which  among  the
conflicting  preferences  to  accommodate,  will  be  deeply  unconvincing.  (Worse,
one's  guesses  about  these  matters  will  of necessity  be  rooted  in observation  of
people conditioned by the prevalence  of a particular set of institutions.  Worse yet,
those guesses themselves-one's own reading of the contaminated evidence, such
as it is-will be similarly conditioned.)
The additional  premises  themselves  assert that products  and leisure do  not
exhaust the  wants  and  preferences  that may be  more  or less satisfied  in  a PP  or
non-PP  regime  and  therefore  have  to  be counted  in  the  efficiency  comparison.
This assertion,  however,  opens  the door  to  more possibilities  than  the premises
allow-for example, that some people  have  a taste for the hurly-burly of SON  or
the  political  machination  of  REG;  or  for  legally  noncompelled  cooperation  or
political participation of a type possible only in SON or REG; or that some have a
deep  aversion to uncertainty  about having their  needs go unmet  when others are
in  a  position  to help  them.  There  may  even  be some  people  who  would  take
enormous  satisfaction  in  the  knowledge  of  being  legally  at  liberty  to go  about
using other people's bodies impulsively,  as the spirit moves-who like  even more
the prospect that the persons within the  bodies may fight back-and who  are, by
contrast,  made  miserable  by  the  knowledge  of being  required  to  bargain  with
other people over the use of their bodies.
One cannot just dismiss such preferences  as "nonrational,"  if rationality is to
16 remain  a  "weak"  premise.  Of  course,  one  might discount  them  as  morally
unworthy  and  thereby perhaps  arrive  at  a  preference  for  PP, in some form,  over
SON,  REG,  and  FSN,  on  noneconomic  moral  grounds.  One  can  also  try
admitting  that there  may  be some  people  with the  licentious preferences,  but  so
few that their deviant wants are plainly outweighed by those of the host of normal
security-preferrers.  Thus  would  one  enter  upon  quasi  empiricism.  Surely  the
crucial countings and "weighings"  are not empirically known or verifiable.  Surely
one's  sense  of  conviction  about  them  arises  from  intellectual  faculties  hard  to
distinguish from those employed in moral intuition and moral reason.  Surely their
stuff is the stuff of Ought, though their form be the form of Is.
2.  Uncertainty, Incentive,  and Product
Let  us now  turn to  additional  premises 4-6,  concerned  with  the untoward
effects on production and satisfaction  of the uncertainty (or insecurity)  associated
with legalized  predation, forced sharing, and the threat  of regulation.  We take up
three  ways  in  which  such  uncertainty  may  be  thought  to  be  economically
detrimental, including some further analysis of the supposed per se preference  for
security of possession.
a.  Uncertainty  as an intrinsic bad or cost.  Let us start by granting, arguendo,
that uncertainty is, indeed, an intrinsically  bad thing to experience.  Comparing PP
with FSN or SON, it is obvious that the choice lies not between "more"  and "less"
56.  See supra pt. I.
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uncertainty  but  between  the  kinds  of  uncertainty  various  people  must  bear.57
Under PP, owners  are certain of future  control of their factors and  products (per
contract  in  the  case  of joint  products),  while  those  whose  holdings,  productive
capacities, or productive motivations fall short of some critical level are uncertain
of having  all  their needs  met  (i.e.,  by  voluntary  charity).  Under  FSN  or SON,
uncertainty  about  having  your  future  needs  met  may  be  reduced  (if  you  are
unproductive or a gifted thief), 5  while  uncertainty  about keeping all your present
holdings  is  certainly  increased.  Since  neither sort of uncertainty  is  any  more  or
less compatible  with rationality than the other, neither regime can  be said, prima
facie, to entail "less"  had uncertainty than the other.
Moreover, experience may afford an antidote to uncertainty  in SON or FNS.
Farmers, for example, may come to know what fraction of a planted crop they can
normally  expect  to reap  and keep.  Indeed,  a  fairly  intelligible  equilibrium  may
emerge,  bolstered  and  structured  by  informal  agreement.  The  total  of  the
bounded  uncertainty  in  a  mature  SON  or  FSN  regime  cannot,  prima  facie,  be
supposed either "more" or "less"  than that of the (one-sided)  uncertainty in pp.
59
Finally, there  is nothing in the rationality  premise  (at least, not in the  weak
or  neutral  sense  that  makes  rationality  almost  irresistible  as  a  working
assumption)  requiring that uncertainty  be regarded  as  intrinsically  bad  or costly.
Risk aversion is no more  rational  than is risk neutrality or a  positive  adventuring
spirit.  Once  we  drop  the  arguendo  assumption  of  the  intrinsic  badness  of
uncertainty,  it obviously becomes impossible  to compare the efficiency of regimes
in terms of the amounts of uncertainty they entail.
b.  Uncertainty and allocation between  labor and leisure.  It  is  sometimes
incautiously  suggested"6  (and, one  suspects,  very  widely just  taken  for granted)
that  minimizing  the  uncertainty  of return  faced  by  (potential)  producers,  at  the
same time denying  any certainty of returns of potential predators, must  certainly
lead to increased  total product.  The intuitive notion is that the farmer  assured of
reaping where he has sown must be the more disposed to sow.  The notion is false.
In  technical  language,  the  mistake  lies  in  a  supposition,  baseless  so  far  as
rationality  is concerned,  that the "substitution  effect"  of replacing  PP  with  SON
will prevail  over the  "income  effect"6-that  is,  that  since  in SON  the trade-off
between labor and leisure is more favorable  to leisure than it is in PP, people will
work less and rest more in SON.
The truth  is  that  the net  result  depends  on  how  strongly  producers  value
increments  of product  vis-A-vis  increments  of  leisure,  given  this  or  that  extant
57.  See Kennedy & Michelman, supra n.  4, at 722-26.
58.  It  is  not  logically  necessary  that this  uncertainty  would  be  reduced,  insomuch  as  the  forced-
sharing  requirement might,  imaginably,  have such a severe depressant effect  on total production  that
no one's needs could be met.  See id. at 724-25.
59.  See id. at 717-18.
60.  E.g. Sir  William Blackstone,  Commentaries  of the  Laws of England *4  (Clarendon  Press 1769);
Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law §3.1, 27-28 (2d ed., Little Brown 1977).
61.  See  e.g. James  M. Henderson  &  Richard  E.  Quandt, Microeconomic Theory  §§  2-6  (2d ed.,
McGraw-Hill  1971).
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combination  of the  two.  If  those  relative  valuations  are  such  that  the  "income
effect"  prevails,  a  farmer  who  anticipates  losing  half  of  his  crop  to  human
predators  will  plant  (in  the  limiting  case)  twice  as much  as  he  otherwise  would
have,  so as to reap  no less than would have been the  case absent predation-and
the result will be twice as much total product for human consumption under SON
than under PP.
But  wait  a  minute.  What  about  the  predator?  Isn't  it  true  a priori  that
people who  in  SON manage  to  live off others,  in PP will  have  to work  for their
livings;  and  that  their product,  at  least,  will be  greater  in  PP?  Supposing  for a
moment that  this is true,  we  still have  no way  of knowing  a priori  that the  total
product  output  is  greater in PP, given that those who  produce in PP may, for all
we  know,  produce  even  more  in  SON.  Moreover,  it  isn't  even  knowable  that
those who are  predators in SON  will be workers  in PP, rather  than recipients  of
voluntary  charity.  Nor  is the  converse knowable, namely  that some  people  who
have to work for a living in PP would, if SON were instituted instead, give up work
in  favor  of predation;  since the  case  might  be  that those  who, in  SON,  obtain  a
certain  standard  of  living  through  predation  (say,  the  same  as  the  maximum
standard they can  achieve  as  workers  in PP) might  find  that life  in  SON at that
standard  generates  additional  wants  more  cheaply  satisfiable  by  work,  given
diminishing  returns  to predation.  Perfectly  possibly,  these  people  would  work
harder and  more  productively in SON than in PP-for example,  if only in SON,
with  the predatory  income  base  (or  supplement)  there  available,  did  it become
practical for them  to think of striving for a total income  ample enough  for cruises
and oriental  rugs.
c.  Lawful predation  and misallocation to precaution and defense.  Here the
notion  is  that,  lacking  legal  guarantees  against  predation,  producers  rationally
must  either  produce  less  highly  valued  (but  also  less  predation-prone)  outputs
than they otherwise would  have  (e.g.,  gather nuts rather than  raise grain), or else
divert  labor  and  resources  to  defensive  outputs  (fences,  private  goon  squads,
mayhem)  that have zero or negative value as final goods, thereby reducing the real
value  of GNP  below  what  it  otherwise  would  have  been.  Again,  the  argument
depends on particular assumptions of fact.  As we move from PP to SON, farmers
may grow less, but they also may grow more;  they may build fences, but they also
may  (it  depends  on comparative  cost-effectiveness)  just  forget  the  fences  and
plant enough  for both the predators  and themselves  (as  one does  with raspberry
bushes, not bothering with  netting or chickenwire  because it's easier just to  raise
enough fruit  to  satisfy one's own wants  and  give the birds  a  free lunch  to boot);
the farmers  may divert  energies  to  defensive  maneuvers  that  they  find tiresome
and  disagreeable,  but  they  also  may  affirmatively  enjoy  their  skirmishing  with
predators  (and  goon-squad  members  who otherwise  would  have languished  their
ways  through  boring  lives  may  find  in  goon-squading  their  true  m~tiers), or-
again-the farmers may just forgo defense altogether.
Just as in the cases of the per se preferences, our counter-speculations  about
insecurity  and  its  consequences  depend  to  some  extent  on  the  possibility  that
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people  have  wants  or  traits  that  may  seem  alien  or  unappealing  (or  worse)  to
"us"-too little self-reliance,  too narrow a dependence  on some particular form of
consumption, a nasty  taste for combat, or whatever.  It seems no more open to us
here  than  it was there to dismiss such  inclinations as irrational.  But how  can we,
then,  pretend  to know  how the balance  of preferences  lies?  The issues  here,  as
there, are at least partly quasi  empirical, our convictions about  them just as hard
to  disentangle  from  the  ingredients  of moral  discourse.  There  is,  to  be  sure,  a
historical  and  anthropological  literature  offering  empirical  evidence  on  some  of
these  questions, 62 but it  is  controversial  and,  at least  for  now,  inconclusive-too
weak  a  foundation  for  strong  convictions  about  the  rightness  or  goodness  of
private property. 63
3.  Coordination  Behavior
The  last  additional  premise  is  that  owners  of  interdependent  holdings,
confronting one another in a changing world in which further coordination always
beckons,  can  make  better  progress  toward  perfect  coordination  (S*)
64  through
numerous, stepwise, small-number  dealings than through more massive, if possibly
fewer,  feats  of  large-number  coordination.  These  more  massive  feats  might
imaginably  take  the  form  either  of  regulation  through  a  political  process  of
collective  decision  or  of cooperation  outside  the  legally  coercive  institutions  of
regulation, property rights, and  enforceable  contract.  What supposed facts  about
the  human  condition  lie  behind  the  belief  that  such  processes  are  generally
doomed  to failure, by comparison  with what can be achieved  through contractual
relations and exchanges based on individualized proprietary  holdings?
a.  No Natural  Harmony?
Let us recall  our hypothetical  case of the  beach.
65 The  preference  we there
developed for  an  internalizing, "bilateralist"  composition  depended  in part  on  a
belief about  the  relative  costliness,  in forgone  gains  from trade,  of the strategic
behaviors  respectively  associated  with large-number  and  small-number  dealings.
But it also, and more  obviously, depended on the specific facts assumed  about the
actual  substance  of  individual  preferences  and, relatedly,  the  utilities  of beach-
based activities-that is, the assumption that everyone wants above all not to have
to hear noise from anyone else's radio.  The example  was rigged to yield a  choice
for bilateralist composition.
Of course,  one  could  as  easily  rig  a  beach  case  of opposite  import-for
example, by supposing it to be known that the only thing anyone likes to do on the
beach is stretch out and listen to music over the radio, everyone has just one radio
of limited power, there is only one station on the air (or  there are several, always
62.  Collected and  cited in John W.  Chapman,  Justice, Freedom, and Property, in  NOMOS  XXII:
Property  289  (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman  eds., N.Y.U.  Press 1980).
63.  See Becker, supra n. 50.
64.  Seesupra pt. III.B.3.
65.  Text accompanying supra nn. 26-27.
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simultaneously  broadcasting  mutually  harmonious  music),  and  the  more  radios
you hear playing together,  the better the music is.  Overhearing, in short, far from
being  a nuisance,  is an unambiguous  benefit to  all participants.  Knowing that  to
be  true,  rational  people  would  prefer  the  configuration  of  hexagons  to  the
alternatives.  The  law  has,  indeed,  sometimes  made  such  choices.  There  are
traditional  legal  doctrines  inclining  to  maximization,  not  minimization,  of
neighborhood  interactions  understood  to  be  mutually  beneficial-for  example,
those  establishing  common  rights  of  transit  in  the  seas  and  inland  navigable
waters,
66 and common rights of access to communications  forums.
67
b.  No Trust?
To  some  extent,  then,  the  belief  that  a  market-structuring  (neighbor-
minimizing)  composition  of holdings  yields better  coordination  than a neighbor-
maximizing  regime  of  common  privilege  may  depend  on  belief  that  cases  of
natural interactive  harmony (such as our second beach case)  occur less frequently
than those of conflictual  neighborhood  relations.  It is hard to fathom  the sense  in
which  such  a  "fact"  might  be  "known."  We  need  not  dwell  on  the  question,
however,  because  the  market-structuring  preference  can  perhaps  survive
confession of inability to answer it.
Suppose we don't know in advance which version  of the beach story is true,
because  we don't  know  the facts  about future  radio  program content,  broadcast
technology, and people's likes  and  dislikes.  If the first (conflictual) version  turns
out to  be  true  after we  have  opted  for  a  nest of hexagons,  the  way  to  efficient
reordering  lies  only  through  cooperation  or  politics;  but  if  the  second
(harmonious)  version  turns out  to  be  true  after  we  are  committed  to  a  row  of
squares,  a  chain  of  bilateral  transactions  conceivably  might  accomplish  the
efficient reordering.  Thus,  a general preference  for market  structure may reflect
belief  that correction is generally  likelier  to  occur through markets than through
cooperation  or politics.
There  remains  the  question  of the behavioral  suppositions  implicit  in  that
belief, and  a crucial one  seems to be that persons  in potentially  conflictual social
situations (beyond the confines  of family and friendship) are typically incapable of
acting  on  mutually  trustful  premises.  No  doubt there  are  substantial  risks  that
cooperative  or  political  processes  will  "fail"  because  of  information  gaps,
communication  difficulties,  and  destructive  strategic  responses  to  such
conditions;68 but on the other hand  there  are  exactly  analogous  risks of "market
66.  E.g.,  the  "public  trust"  doctrine,  see generally Joseph  L.  Sax,  The  Public Trust Doctrine in
Natural  Resource Law: Effective Judicial  Intervention, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 471  (1970).
67.  Here  the  salient  doctrines  are  constitutional  free  speech  guaranties.  E.g. Shuttlesworth  v.
Birmingham, 394 U.S.  147  (1969);  Lovell  v.  Griffin, 303  U.S. 444  (1938).  For a striking  example  of
preference  for  the  social  benefits  of  unhindered  communication  over  avoidance  of  the  costs  of
neighborhood  conflict,  see  People v.  Stover,  191  N.E.2d  272,  277  (N.Y.  1963)  (Van  Voorhis,  J.,
dissenting).
68. See e.g. Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (Harper & Row 1957); George J.
Stigler, The  Citizen and the State ch. 8 (U. Chi. Press 1975).
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failure., 69   What  makes  the  risks  seem  heavier  for  cooperative  and  political
processes  is,  I  suggest,  their  pronounced  multiparty  character,  which  seems  to
escalate  the  likelihood  that  they  will  constitute  "prisoners'  dilemmas"  or
comparably  tragic  strategic  fixes7°  will  be,  in  Mancur  Olson's  classification,
instances  of  "latent"  rather  than  "privileged"  or  "intermediate"  groups. 7 1  And
prisoners'  dilemmas just epitomize trustlessness in social affairs.
c.  Rationality, Trust, and the "Tragedy of the Commons"
The pessimistic view of human capacity for trustful cooperation has found its
special  metaphor  in  the  "commons"  upon  which  preindustrial  villagers  grazed
their cattle.
The  rational herdsman  concludes  that  the only sensible  course...  to  pursue  is to
add  another  animal  to  [its]  herd.  And  another;  and  another ....  But  this  is  the
conclusion  reached  by  each  and  every rational  herdsman  sharing  a  commons....
Each  man  is locked  into a  system  that compels  him  to  increase  his  herd  without
limit-in a world that  is limited.  Ruin is the destination  toward which all men rush,
each pursuing  his own  best interest  in  a society  that believes  in the freedom  of the
72 commons.
The  "commons"  stands  for  isomorphic  predicaments  observed  in  modern
life,  most typically  associated  with environmental degradation:  "The  rational man
finds that his share of the cost of the wastes he discharges into the commons is less
than the  cost of purifying  his wastes before  releasing them.  Since  this is true for
everyone, we  are locked into a system of 'fouling  our own nest.""'  A comparable
case  is  said  to  be  presented  by  "freedom  to breed"  in  the setting  of a  modern
welfare state commitment  to social support for the needy: "To couple  the concept
of freedom  to breed with  the belief  that everyone  horn has  an equal right  to  the
commons is to lock the world into a tragic course of action."74
All  these  can  be  recognized  as  instances  of  the  general  configuration  of
interests  called  by  Schelling  "multi-person  prisoner's  dilemma,"  and  abstractly
modeled by him as follows:
1.  There  are  n  people,  each  with  the  same  binary  choice  and  the  same
payoffs."
69.  See e.g. Francis M. Bator, The Anatomy of Market Failure,  72 0. J. Econ. 351  (1958).
70.  See text accompanying infra nn. 72-75.
71.  See Mancur  Olsen,  The  Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the  Theory of Groups
(Harv. U. Press 1971).
72.  Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, in  Economic Foundations of Property Law 2, 4
(Bruce A. Ackerman ed., Little, Brown & Co.  1975)  (reprinting  162 Science 1243 (1968)).
73.  Id. at 5.
74.  Id. at 6.
75.  Thomas  C.  Schelling,  Micromotives  and Macrobehavior (W.W.  Norton  &  Co.  1978).  The
"commons"  problem can be cast into this "binary choice"  form by characterizing  the choice facing each
herdsman as  that of grazing  or not grazing  more than  c head  on the commons,  where  c is a constant
number.
[Vol. 39:663
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2.  Each has  a preferred  choice whatever the others do; and the same choice
is preferred by everybody.
3.  Whichever choice  a person makes, he or she  is better off, the more there
are among the others who choose their unpreferred alternative.
4.  There  is  some  number,  k,  greater  than  1,  such  that  if  individuals
numbering  k or more choose their unpreferred alternative  and the rest do
not, those who do are better off than if they had all chosen their preferred
alternatives, but if they number less then k this is not true.
Is  the  situation  thus  depicted  truly  such  that  self-interested  agents  are
rationally driven to reciprocal self-destruction?  Does the way to salvation truly lie
only  through  abolition  of  the  freedom  of  the  commons  in  favor  of  regulation
through property rights or collective control?  Cooperation based on mutual trust,
if that  is conceivable  for rationally  self-interested  human agents, would  avoid  the
catastrophe  as  well;  so  if  cooperative  behavior  is  rationally  possible,  then
commonses are not generically  tragic.  But cooperative behavior  must be possible
if  avoidance  of  commonses  is  practically  discussable  at  all;  for  the  policy  of
extirpating commonses  in favor  of property rights (or other regulation)  assuredly
depends on the possibility of cooperation.
What is private property,  regarded  from the standpoint  of economic  policy,
but  a  particular  form  of  regulation, 6  a  species  of  those  "definite  social
arrangements  . . . that  create  coercion  of  some  sort,"77  institution  of  which  is
offered  as  the  alternative  to tragedy?  But then  come  the  questions:  Instituted
(fashioned, decided upon) by whom? Policed and enforced by whom?  Obeyed by
whom,  and  why?  Because  if (and  only if!)  I don't obey,  the constable  will  catch
me, the prosecutor try me, the magistrate convict me, the sheriff punish me?  Who
will make them?  Where can the  regress end, if not in uncoerced  cooperation, the
untragic commons  of constitutional  practice  founded  on a  "rule"  that there  is  no
one to enforce but that people on the whole adhere to, though adherence  is in the
interest  of no  one  who  does  not  trust  that  (most)  others  will  adhere  to  it,  by
"mutual  agreement."78  In other words: no trust, no property.  In the very survival
of proprietary institutions we have empirical evidence of the possibility of trust; as
we have in the electorate's behavior each election day.79
Short of absurdity,  then, the metaphor  of the  commons  cannot speak  to  us
more powerfully of the rational necessity of social cooperation  than of its rational
possibility.  In this dialectic  of necessity and  possibility, private property emerges
as a possible  device or instrumentality  for social cooperation-available,  as such,
only to  agents who have, in the first place, a capacity for cooperative action.  The
76.  See Kennedy & Michelman, supra  n. 4, at 769-70.
77.  Hardin, supra  n.  72, at 9.
78.  Id. at 10.
79.  It  has  often  been  observed  that,  according  to  rational  calculation,  the  costs  to  an  individual
voter of casting a vote  on election  day must virtually always exceed the expected  value  to the voter of
casting the vote.  See e.g. Downs, supra n. 68.
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initial  premise  has  to  be  that  of  cooperative  capacity;  it  cannot  be  the
contradictory  of that.
Since  cooperation  is-has  to be-both  possible  and  existent  without  and
prior to property, the domain  of property cannot  be coextensive  with  that of  the
commons  (all  commonses).  Property  is  a  scheme  of  social  cooperation  whose
utility  is  always  a  question  for  judgment  and  choice,  dependent  on  multiple
considerations  varying  with  the  circumstances,  rather  than  impelled  by  some
universal  and inexorable  grim  logic of welfare.  In  any given commons,  property
may offer the best mode of cooperation, but it also may not.
4.  The Additional Premises in Aggregate
I  have  said  that  the  truth  of at  least  one  of  the  additional  premises  is  a
necessary condition of the truth of PET.  It is not, however,  a sufficient condition.
The truth of PET entails further conditions  respecting the premises in partial and
total aggregates.  To exhibit the  full complement  of further conditions  would be
tiresome.  A  single  example  will  suffice  both  to  illustrate  their  nature  and  to
advance my argument.
Suppose  premise  3  were  false,  the truth  being  that  people  generally  and
strongly prefer to work out their affairs cooperatively  or politically, rather than by
arm's-length  dealings  on  markets.  Suppose  also  that  there  were  convincing
empirical  evidence  for the  truth  of  any or all  of premises 4-7.  PET as  a  whole
would  remain  empirically  unverified,  because the gains in  product  that premises
4-7 supposedly  tell  us will result from  shifting to  PP from SON or REG may be
more than  offset  by  the  loss  in satisfaction  from that  same  shift implied  by the
supposed falsity of premise 3.  But premise 3 can be no more empirically false than
empirically true:  it  is,  inescapable,  quasi  empirical.  As long as  it remains  so,  so
does  PET.  Proof  of  PET  strictly  requires  empirical  verification  of  all  the
additional premises.  No doubt verification  of all but  one  or two  of them would
make PET highly plausible.  But verification  of only one or two-which seems the
most that can be claimed  at present-only marginally affects plausibility.
V.  WHY DOES PET MATTER?
There  is  an illuminating  literature in economics  devoted  to  explaining  how
and  why property  institutions  are  efficient  when and  insofar as  they sometimes,
indubitably, are8 °  Some  of that literature  seems to make rather  sweeping  claims
on  behalf  of  private  property-to  treat  it,  indeed,  as  presumptively  efficient.
None that I know of expressly purports to deduce the general efficiency of private
property without reliance on behavioral premises  additional to that of rationality,
and a careful reader can always infer the additional premises that must be implicit
in the literature's accounts of the efficiency virtues of private property.
80.  E.g. Richard J. Agnello  & Lawrence  P. Donnelly, Property Rights and Efficiency in the Oyster
Industry, 18 J.L. &  Econ. 521  (1975);  Harold Demsetz,  Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57  Am.
Econ. Rev. 347 (1967).
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The aim  of this chapter, then,  is not to disprove  an explicit  thesis elsewhere
espoused,  but  rather  to  urge  the  importance  of  making  additional  premises
explicit.  Doing  so  will,  I  believe,  help  avoid  the  danger  that  efficiency-based
accounts of private property institutions  will obscure the critical  vision that ought
to  be  directed  toward  such  institutions  as they  are found  from  time  to time  in
actual practice.
Here  is  the  critique  of PET  in  a  nutshell.  Whoever  thinks  that  private
property is a  good thing is  committed to some  belief in addition to  (i) experience
accrues  to individuals,  (ii)  individuals  are rational  maximizers of satisfactions, and
(iii)  it is good to allow  for an increase in the  levels  of satisfaction  experienced  by
individuals.  The necessary  additional  belief may  be  quasi  empirical,  such  as  (a)
every properly formed  human individual places  a supremely high value  on secure
command over his or her body, labor, and product, or  (b) to a degree that makes
the  exceptions  practically negligible, rational  conation  in socially situated  human
individuals  always  takes  the  form  of the  trustless  "prisoner"  mentality.  Or  the
necessary  additional  belief may be purely moral, such  as  (c)  irrespective  of what
various  individuals may  subjectively  want,  it  is  right that  each  person  should  be
secured  in the command  over his or her own person;  or it may be a  composite  of
moral and empirical  belief such as (d) justice requires that the distribution among
members of a society of the means to satisfaction  periodically  satisfy the minimal
requirements  of D;8' and  the  only  regimes  that  will  satisfy  D (or  will  satisfy  D
without  excessive  sacrifice  of  efficiency)  are,  as  it  happens,  private  property
regimes.  The  critique  of  PET,  then,  is  a  challenge  to  all  defenders  of  private
property to know their additional premises.
The  point is  not  that the  serviceable  additional  premises  are  all  invalid  or
indefensible.  Far from it.  Rather the point  is that many-it may  be all-of the
appealing additional  premises  are potentially  the grounds of significantly  critical
appraisal  of the particular, detailed embodiment of private property we may from
time  to  time  observe  in  practice.  Suppose,  for  example,  you  think  that  the
efficiency  of private property  is rooted in  a species-characteristic  need or craving
for  privacy  and  security of  person,  or for  the experience  of self-command  over
personal labor and  product.  Then  if you observed  a society  in which measurable
numbers of persons were selling rights over their bodies in exchange for the means
of  subsistence,  or  could  live  only  by  submitting  to  the  productive  direction  of
others, you would have to see  that situation as problematic.  Though it might turn
out that  there  is no way,  in this vale  of tears,  to make  things on the  whole  any
better,  you  would  be  committed  to  at  least  searching  for  some  corrective.
Similarly if your commitment to private property were more generally  based on a
conviction  that  only  a  property  regime  could  hope  to  satisfy  distributional
criterion D at a tolerable level of efficiency, then you would be committed  as well
to continual  scanning of the extant regime to see whether it was in fact resulting in
a D-satisfactory  distribution,  and  to support  of corrective  action  whenever  such
81.  See supra pt. II.C.
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was  both needed  and  available.  And  suppose, finally,  that your commitment  to
private  property  was  rooted  in  belief  that  individuals  do,  as  a  matter  of  fact,
usually exhibit prisoner  rationality  in their encounters  with one another.  It  is at
least  a possibility  that you would,  on further  reflection, think  that  a world  truly
void  of  social  trust  would  be  an  extremely  dangerous  place,  and  also  that the
relation  between  the  condition  of trustlessness  and  given  institutions  of private
property might  be  not unidirectional  but reciprocal-so  that  not only  is private
property  a prudent  response  to a  given  state of trustlessness,  but also  particular
private  property  arrangements  sanction  and  reinforce  trustlessness.  With  that
provisional  view, you might want to keep on investigating, rather than considering
the matter closed.
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